In 2016 populism became the favorite word of the press, the political establishment and the middle class supporters of liberalism. Their perception of the world is based upon the premise that the liberal world order is under threat from the popular backlash against immigration and free trade. Whilst this is often not a fair characterization of the ‘populists’ demands, it carries as an accepted theory in the broadcasting world at least.
The history of populism, whether it be present in Trump’s election or the vote to leave the European Union, is varied and seems to be distilled into three categories. Firstly, the right wing, ‘chauvinistic’ populism, apparent today in Trump but, as Prof. Ferguson notes, is traced back to Daniel Kearney. Secondly, the left wing form of populism present in Corbyn and Sanders in the UK and USA: its goals differ significantly since whilst both forms tend to proclaim protectionism, left wing populism often downplays social issues particularly immigration. A final form of populism, its most extreme, is surely what has been in play in parts of Eastern Europe. The rise of the Law and Justice Party in Poland as been built upon the precepts of a corrupt, political elite imposing social liberalism on the masses. However, its methods to counter act such change are fundamentally illiberal and not conservative.
Whilst the characterization, debates about the history of populism and fortune telling are interesting, perhaps those worried about the rise of populism could turn to the history of the anti-populist. If the populist is the demagogue who gives the people what they want, then the anti-populist disagrees and not only finds larger causal issues for the majorities’ issues, but also attacks their innocence as the oppressed stakeholder. The effective anti-populist is also aware of the role of the political establishment, not only in dealing with populism but in causing it to rise in the first place. Thus the effective anti-populist must adopt pragmatism and be willing to view the world as it is, not how they would like to see it.
The example that clearly comes to mind is Cato the Younger in his speech against Caesar during the Second Catiline Conspiracy. Whilst the speech does not deal with the issue of populism, only the punishment of its conspirators, the content and principles provide an interesting guide to the stabilization of politics.
His credentials are established by his immediate attack on the citizens of Rome saying, ‘I have complained about the extravagance and greed of our citizens.’ As Sallust has previously elaborated on, much of Catiline’s initial populism comes from the greed of Romans, both upper and lower class, meaning that there is substantial disenfranchisement and anger with the political classes. This theme of the failure of virtue is one that Sallust has elaborated on in his quasi-prologue to the Catiline Conspiracy but forms an interesting filter through which to understand how unrest can happen. This is partially because it affects both the elite and the lower orders thus meaning social and political cohesion suffers.
Cato goes on to elaborate that instead of the traditional virtuous wealth the Romans have ‘private wealth’. Thus Cato provides the example of the “good” anti-populist as he criticizes the elites in society as well. This could well lead to criticism of my characterization. However, the effective anti-populist must surely deal with the legitimate failings of the elite. Firstly, so as to provide a compromise with the disenfranchised but also so as to prevent future rises in populism. Furthermore, Cato promotes his reasoning through use of reason to persuade that his policy is that which is rooted in the tradition. Citing the sacrifices Torquatus he draws attention to the fact that the elites must also change since what made Rome good once, is severely lacking in the methods of the politicians.
Cato’s speech thus provides two critiques of the current political status quo which provide important lessons to times of chaos. His contention, in my view, is that the whole of society has failed. Both the upper and lower echelons have failed morally and given into selfish vices. Secondly, he argues not only that politicians have failed but that they cannot even agree on the correct way of dealing with the populists.
Applying such lessons to the world of 2017 will be a momentous task. Primarily the contradictions inherent in pursuance of policy that would please these two aspects would make it hard for a politician or party to ever enter office. The recognition of the failure of the elites and their failure in methods of dealing with populism, thus the small justification in populist outbursts, would make one unpopular with the political class who still have a hegemony on funding and infrastructure. Secondly, the condemnation of the expectations of populists inevitably leads one to fall out with the masses.
No doubt this will be a hard task for those who control the centre of the Conservative and Labour parties in Britain. Self awareness will take some time to come. However, the outlook Cato provides on the complex issues surrounding unrest and populism is still worth adopting when considering the current situation: some woes are justified, though some expectations are false and the elites have some accountability in this. In 2017, we can at least hope for some adoption of a nuanced view of politics.
Further reading and works cited
W. Batstone, William Sallust: Catiline’s Conspiracy Oxford University Press, 2010
Applebaum, Anne In Poland, a preview of what Trump could do to America Washington Post, Sept. 19th 2016
Ferguson, Niall Is the US having a populist moment? Boston Globe, Feb. 29th 2016
Can a coherent policy of international relations be attributed to Edmund Burke? This is the task that one faces when arguing that, indeed a coherent policy can be found in his writing. Burke unlike other political philosophers and politicians does not make it easy: not many can say that they supported only one of the great revolutions of the 18th Century. As Monk notes in a review, this fueled the partisan approach to understanding Burke with the ire of William Hazlitt incurred for apparent hypocrisy. Hazlitt would not be the last either: Marx described Burke only as the ‘sycophant’, crudely reducing the complex debate of Reflections into a set of excuses for cynical motives. This part of the essay will analyse Burke’s own arguments surrounding the American War of Independence with the next part showing the continuity into the French Revolution.
Though Simms noted Burke’s first attacks on the foreign policy of the day being the Partition of Poland, he gives a brief account of his arguments against the British position in America. As the reader learns from previous attacks, Burke supported a fairly traditional Whig perspective of keeping Continental alliances so as to prevent a shift in the power balance of Europe. As was apparent by the Bourbons joining forces with the American colonists, this had failed drastically. In this context we see Burke emerge to criticize the use of German mercenaries as an ‘alliance of a few traders in human flesh.’ (Simms, pg. 609) This criticism of Britain’s reliance on George the Third’s position in Germany was in line with Burke’s other writings. He noted the gratitude at realizing the cause of the Americans with reference to them only fighting the ‘professional armies of Germany’ (Hart, pg. 222), perhaps reflecting his view of the injustice in the waging of the war.
Righteous indignation was apparently sidelined by Burke who favored the reconciliation between the colonists and the English in a speech he gave to Parliament. In this speech he talked of the need to ‘recollect’ since ‘whilst we are left naked on one side, our other flank is uncovered by any alliance.’ (Simms, pg. 634) His argument for reconciliation here raises two points. Firstly, that the end of the war must be brought about for the strategic purpose of protecting the nation from a European alliance. Secondly, he is arguing that right causes must be put aside so as to protect the country from a power which ‘threatened us with ruin.’ (Simms, pg. 634) Instead of the righteous rhetoric and ideological principals that radicals stated Burke with for the freedom of the colonies, it seems instead that his his defense of the colonies was based on a realist’s analysis of the international state of Europe and the need to preserve the country he loved.
A cursory reading of Burke seems to reveal that there is no separation between his beliefs about America and those of France. It certainly contrasts with the radical liberalism that Paine espoused, one that Walker describes as being based on a vision ‘peaceful, democratic, and egalitarian societies interacting within a cosmopolitan international order based on reason and justice.’ (Walker, pp. 52) Burke’s criticisms of the war in the colonies was not based on vision but on reality; he realized that the problems in the colonies could lead to disaster in Europe. The overlapping of policy prescriptions thus, are not indicative of a shared ideology: realists and anti-imperialists could agree that the Iraq War was a disaster though they differ on principle. The tarnishing of Burke’s reputation was unfortunate and based on an optimistic reading of his speeches about the War of Independence. However, it also serves as an important warning for future men of letters to understand the views and principles for why those views are held, before entering into polemical attacks.
Hampsher-Monk, Iain (2015) How to Think Like Edmund Burke: Debating the Philosopher’s Complex Legacy, Foreign Affairs (January/February edition)
Hart, Jeffrey (1967) Burke and Radical Freedom The Review of Politics , Vol. 29, No. 2 (pp. 221-238), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hitchens, Christopher (2004) Reactionary Prophet The Atlantic, (April edition)
Simms, Brendan (2008) Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783 Penguin, London
Walker, Thomas C. (2000) The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine’s Cosmopolitanism and International Relations. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 1, 2000, pp. 51–72.
The war between the Persians and Greeks only intensifies in the second last Book of Herodotus’ history: this is the Book in which the prevailing forces of the Persians are finally reversed with their navy left defeated and their king in fear of the consequences. In addition, this Book highlights further the differences between Athens and Sparta as it establishes the conservative mindset of the Spartan people.
Artemisium and Salamis
As the Persians moved their forces to fight the Greeks at Artemisium it was the strategy of the Greeks which ensured their victory. This was especially vital since the Greeks were hopelessly outnumbered. Though Herodotus does give some figures pertaining to the number of Persian ships and sailors, these do seem far fetched. Once again it was Themistocles who provided much of the cunning strategy. According to Herodotus he left a message to the Ionians serving with Xerxes, which included some Carians, with the purpose of trying to separate them from the bulk of the Persian force. Herodotus notes the effectiveness of the strategy since it is clear that even if they had not switched sides, Xerxes would fear such actions and thus would prevent them from serving in the battles.
Once again it is the supposed strengths of the Persians which turn out to be their ruin. In conventional warfare, it may seem wise to utilize the largest number of ships in a battle, especially when these far outnumber your opponent. However, this backfired on Xerxes since the smaller force of the Greeks could easily outmaneuver their ships and this caused crashes and rendered their navy useless. Furthermore, Xerxes’ arrogance and incompetency is proved beyond doubt by the poor quality of his force. Herodotus reveals that many of the marines and sailors were in fact unable to swim properly. This was of course a disastrous oversight of Xerxes and therefore reinforces my analysis of Book Seven since he failed to properly think about the invasion. The juxtaposition between leader and military in Book Seven seems all the more clear and it seems as though Herodotus is noting that magnitude and power of a civilization is no testimony to their intelligence or worth. One could take this further. Xerxes is mockingly described as Zeus by one of the Greeks at the Hellespont in Book Seven. Xerxes’ earthly power is obviously perceived by himself to be indicative of the power of the Gods. Herodotus is showing that the link between earthly power and the religious is non-existent and a false construction. This relates back to my analysis of Book Four as the Scythians answer only to Zeus and Hera and appear more skeptical of the power of man.
Xerxes continues this trend of unholiness and reacts in his way by having Athens burned with its temples destroyed. This is a disproportionate action in response to his own defeat, and thus insinuating of his dictatorial character.More importantly in this passage, is what we learn of the Athenians. They, the Athenians, abandon their city and are willing to give up their homes. This seems to suggest that their view of the polis is centered on the survival of their nation as a people and that they are a pragmatic people who are willing to make short term sacrifices in order to gain in the long term. This is not that unsurprising since Herodotus points out in Book One that many of the Ionians abandoned their homes such as the Carians and the Xanthians. Though it is odd given that the Athenians’ unique claim is that they are supposedly the only Greeks who have lived on their land for an eternity and thus have a unique connection.
All of this contrasts with the reaction of the Spartans. Though their land has not yet been ravaged by the Persians they worry far more about their state of affairs. For example they begin to build a wall to defend the Isthmus against the threat of the Persians. Further to, they also suggest that they will return to Sparta to defend, giving the Athenians a headache over getting them to defend Salamis and engage in a final naval battle. In defense of the Spartans, Herodotus does mention repeatedly the sacrifice they made in Book Seven in fighting at Thermopylae and thus they do deserve some credit and a diluted criticism. Though this does present a divide between the Spartans and the Athenians: the Spartans are so deeply connected to their way of life and land that they will not make a basic sacrifice for the greater survival of the Hellenic peoples, whilst the Athenians have given up their ancient city. However, once again this must be tempered; after all, the Athenians had colonies in Italy which they could have moved to and thus were just as willing to surrender the cause of the Hellenes.
The pragmatic leadership of Themistocles, according to Herodotus, is the cause of a second union between the two nations and the defeat of the Persians again. According to Herodotus, the Athenian used a messenger to alert Xerxes to their position and encourage a naval battle by admitting that the forces are divided. Ironically, Xerxes acting on this advice brings greater unity to the Greek forces and thus the defeat of Xerxes. This reinforces the reader’s image of Xerxes: he acts on advice from a Greek without questioning the ulterior motive of the Greeks. This is of course an obvious action in the course of war. Furthermore, he ignores Artemisia’s advice with regards to the defeat of the Greeks. She correctly points out the need to destroy the Spartans and the method of creating fractious alliances: by invading Sparta. This, the reader knows from the debates, would lead to the Spartans abandoning the Athenians cause and sailing back. As an evaluative point, I would like to reinforce Herodotus’ characterization of Themistocles. By recounting the events Thucydides presents in his first Book, when Themistocles betrays the Spartans over the building of the Athenian walls, he shows that Themistocles was a pragmatic, if at times, cynical and expedient leader.
As one would expect, the Persians are defeated at Salamis as well. They had not learned from their previous encounters with the Greeks and Xerxes’ poor leadership has not helped. This is perhaps best signified when he mistakenly thinks that Artemisia’s ramming of a Persian ship was an act of valor. This reveals Xerxes has no understanding of the inner workings of those around him. This has been established previously; his uncle fails to convey to him the extent of Mardonius’ ambitions and his adviser, Demaratus, had warned the Spartans of the invasion. The political figure of Xerxes can now be called into question as well. It appears that like all the previous Persian kings, they are politically shrewd when obtaining power and useless at managing power when they have it. It is thus no surprise when Xerxes heeds the advice of Artemisia and flees to the Hellespont.
Another rift occurs between the Athenians and Spartans over the conclusion of the battle since the Athenians wanted to pursue Xerxes. This is tactically used by Themistocles who tries to convince Xerxes that he was the one who let him go. Unlike few of the people Herodotus discusses he thinks about possibility that the Athenians will turn on him and exile him. Importantly he understands how treacherous the Greeks can be and the selfishness of human nature. However, one who has read Thucydides may question whether Themistocles has read the nature of the Athenians, or whether his eventual ostracism will be the result of a culture of pragmatism and selfishness that he has encouraged.
The final debate
The final part of Book Eight relates how Alexander of Macedon is used by the Persians to deliver a message offering a truce between the Persians and the Athenians. The political structure of Cyrus and Darius is showed to have been continued with the use of stooges and despots in the countries dominated by the Persians. Once again the Persians are shown to have little understanding of their enemy since they underestimate how much freedom is worth to the Athenians. The Athenians value their freedom above all else. Regardless, this is a fact that could be ascertained by simple logic. The Athenians chose to rebel and aid their fellow Ionians, they chose not to give Earth and Water to Darius and they chose to fight at Marathon regardless of their numbers and resources.
Interestingly, the Spartans take a realist approach and regardless of the feud before Salamis offer, and their hesitation in providing an army for a campaign in Boeotia, they step in to provide aid and assistance. The Athenians thank Spartans but reassert their love of freedom and refuse their aid. This does seem to be a point at which the Athenians are willing to distinguish themselves and gain their independence as quickly as possible. This is supported by the fact that Book Five dealt with their rebellion and it is made clear that the Spartans were a threat to the Athenians. In addition, they also chastise Spartans for retreating and not offering troops for Boeotia campaign
Book Eight consolidates much of what was established in Book Seven with regards to the failings of Xerxes. Again, it reinforces the need for the study of history in understanding one’s enemy. One could question my thesis here: a reader may ask, where was the Spartan understanding of the Persians? Where was the Athenian understanding? Whilst there is no open acknowledgement of their enemy, there are two pieces of rebuttal to this point. Firstly, the Athenians were on the back-foot and defending their own land, thus they have the knowledge to utilize as they choose Artemisium and Salamis as their positions to fight at. Secondly, their awareness of the size of the Persian fleet and their use of this against them at Artemisium is evidence of their use of knowledge. Importantly, they think rationally and do not rely purely on material strength. As previously stated, the Book establishes the differences between the two main nations of Sparta and Athens. Many points in their unity thus also serve as points of clash in the decades to come.
Herodotus’ seventh book brings together many of the strands developed in previous books of hubris, Greek development and the clash of civilizations. This rests on an interpretation of Herodotus which states he was a purposeful, subtle historian, one which I agree with.
Darius’ last days
Herodotus opens with the failure of Darius to comprehend his armies’ defeat at Marathon and his decision to invade Greece. This is all indicative of the arrogance of Persian kings from Cyrus through to Xerxes since it is Athens’s size which should act evidence for the Persians that size and established power is not all that is required for effective rule and military success. This message is seemingly reinforced by the news that Darius received after that Egypt had revolted, showing his control over the Empire waned and was problematic. Like Cyrus and Cambyses he ended his reign with failure which was the reflection of arrogant leadership and shortsightedness.
Unfortunately, the education history provides all with was lost on the rising prince in Persia. Xerxes is told by Herodotus to have not been Darius’ eldest son but instead the first born son of the daughter of Cyrus. Whilst this gives some legitimacy to his claim to being ruler, when compared to the madness of Cambyses, an actual son of Cyrus, this claim immediately appears weak to the reader. Interestingly, he becomes king through the machinations of the former King of Sparta, Demaratus. Demaratus will go on to be a wise adviser to Xerxes, unfortunately, his advice is not heeded to at times of import.
In presenting the debates around the invasion of Greece, a task Xerxes is showed to be incapable of doing, Herodotus shows his key character failing. Xerxes is despotic and tyrannical, but he is also weak and indecisive. At an important time in the existence of the Empire, facing a rebellious group of nations, he is swayed by Mardonius’ arguments to launch into a rash attack against the Ionians. Whilst Mardonius puts forward a convincing argument, that invasion will punish the Greeks and give greater way to expanding the Empire, Herodotus clearly shows that this is rooted in his own self interest. The fact Herodotus gives little attention to his sources in this part would suggest that this may have been his hypothesis, further strengthening the argument that Herodotus was shaping this Book to make a point about the nature of rule and despotism.
Xerxes’ failings continue since not only is he easily swayed but he is shown to be ignorant and dismissive of his uncle, Artabanes’. This is of course problematic since his uncle points out that Mardonius has selfish intentions in persuading the King to go to war, though this is conveniently ignored by Xerxes. Fundamentally he is fundamentally despotic since even after it is pointed out that Xerxes will be defeated as his father was in Scythia (they will rout them and then deconstruct Hellespont bridge) he refuses to acknowledge this evidence. Furthermore, he is shown to be weak and unsure of his own command. For example, he asks that Artabanes go to his bed as he would so as to invoke a dream giving prophesies. His issue is thus that he acts despotically but ineffectively since he is unsure of his own decisions.
The crossing and invasion of Greece
Xerxes personal failings are symbolized in his actual invasion of Greece. He decides he will enter Greece by constructing canals and the bridge at the Hellespont but with such drama and stagecraft so as to prove his might. Herodotus devotes pages to carefully listing the armies, their equipment, their country of origin and their military statuses who come with Xerxes to Greece. One cannot help but feel that this is Herodotus showing the complete ridiculousness of Xerxes’ nature. His observation of the failure at Marathon is the numbers, whilst numbers of course did not cause the Athenian victory. His misdiagnosis and flaunting of his military strength becomes evidence of his failings as a leader and signposts to the reader that the expedition itself would fail. Later, when he crosses the Hellespont and offers the sword, cup and bowl to the Gods, he shows himself to be a dramatist and peacock. Ironically, this magnificent display sets him up for failure.
His tyrannical, dictator like cruelty is on full display in the journey into Greece. This is made apparent in the murder of a patron’s eldest son who he wanted to stay behind to look after him. The patron’s crime was to think that he was above the status of a slave, which is everyone in Xerxes’ eyes excluding his own person. This behavior is the kind of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin and thus Herodotus’ characterization is worth its study since it provides some psychological insight into the mind of dictators. He does display some compassion: on looking out on his vast army, he notes how it is sad that all men will cease to be. Artabanes counters saying the sadness comes from the fact that the Gods make life sweet enough to be missed. This conversation also has hints of Solon’s discussion in Book One. There is thus the suggestion that failure to understand happiness is coming back to haunt leadership. This raises the question of whether Herodotus is making a judgement about humanities’ inability to understand happiness throughout the History.
Herodotus also shows through the eyes of Demaratus that Xerxes is destined to fail. The reader is presented with two contrasting images of Xerxes’ expedition: that of the physical armies and the inner workings of Xerxes’ strategy, one is magnificent, the other weak. Demaratus points out that the Greeks will not so easily be pushed over and will fight for their freedom. He argues that the Greek’s strength comes from an obedience to the law which Xerxes is obliged to dismiss. The irony is that misunderstanding of other cultures and peoples has led to the defeat of the Persians time and time again. Darius fundamentally failed to conquer Scythia because he failed to see how their way of living would make a traditional invasion useless. Xerxes here is ignoring a vital source of information about the Greeks: their former king. As a general comment on Herodotus’ writing, these passages could be Herodotus is writing himself into the narrative. He is saying that the studies of culture, heritage and history are essential because these are organs of society which are connected to geopolitics.
Herodotus’ complexity as a historian is only further developed in this passage since he makes use of the modern idea of the counter-factual. Whilst he used it earlier in the history his use is most obvious here. He argues that Athens was essential to the liberation of Greece because without it the Spartans would have been cut off and would eventually have been defeated. This use of the counter-factual could point to Herodotus’ favored side in the war. Whilst he does, in Book Eight, provide further evidence of his support for the Athenians this is by no means conclusively true. The need for the Spartan troops and aid at Thermopylae show how much of the Athenian strategy rested on Spartan co-operation.
An interesting passage is that of the Athenians debating with the message of the Oracle of Delphi over whether they should fight in the oncoming war. Thucydides rarely shows the Athenians consulting any form of religious authority, with the Dorians being more preoccupied with religious matters. However, this is evidence that consultation with the Oracle was not uncommon. The eventual decision to side with Themistocles regardless and dismiss the Oracles’ message is also revealing of the Athenians. Ultimately, they are shown to favor the opinion of man over the divine and practical, reason over hypothetical superstition. This all seems to be true since much of Pericles’ later leadership in Athens promotes the limitless expansion of the Athenians and joins the achievements of the ancestors, the dead and current Athenians with the man made creation of the city-state. A Straussian reading would definitely agree that the Athenians had a godless streak within them (further supported by Cleisthenes’ deceitful use of the Oracle to persuade the Spartans to aid them).
The peak of Athenian pragmatism and reason is shown in these passages. Firstly, the leadership of Themistocles is fixed upon the development of a navy, utilizing the recently developed silver mines to fund this. This shows the elevation of the community and development of the Athenians, a departure from some of the later hyper-realist acts of Themistocles. Secondly, the Athenians do attempt to build alliances. Their efforts with Sparta manage to overcome their ‘Athenian Exceptionalism’ (i.e. claiming rights to leadership because of their ancient Ionian status) and they put aside their feuds with the Aeginetans in order to gain an alliance. Even their attempts to recruit the Syracusans, which are marked with bitterness, show their willingness to compromise. They ultimately cannot recruit the Syracusans, not because of their arrogance or obstinacy, but because of their agreement with the Spartans. As a side note, the Syracusans attack the Athenians for wanting everything but not being willing to concede anything. Interestingly, this does not describe the Athenians now, but it is an accurate description of their interests in the late 5th century when they are not willing to compromise Alcibiades’ imperialism with Nicias’ realism and invade Sicily. My own constant comparison between these passages of Herodotus and Thucydides are deliberate: this is because there is a development of portrayal of sophisticated diplomacy many critics associate only with Thucydides.
Sparta encounters similar issues that the Athenians had. They try to attempt compromise with the Argives, their long standing enemy, but to little success. Herodotus does show some pan-Hellenic unity with the Athenians and Spartans working together by positioning land forces first in Thessaly, then at Thermopylae and moving fleet to Artemisium. The Athenian’s dominance of naval matters and Sparta’s primacy in hoplite military strategy shows that the two are natural allies and not enemies. This accounts for much of the awkward ‘intercourse’ of the early stages of the Peloponnesian War in which the Spartans ravage Attica by foot whilst the Athenians target Spartan allied islands and carry out naval raids.
Herodotus once again draws the reader’s attention back to Solon’s words in Book One. According to Herodotus, the Spartans claim that they should not fear Xerxes since the greater the man, the greater his fall will be when his luck runs out. Once again the words of Solon about chance, success and leadership come back to haunt Xerxes. Herodotus ultimately knows this will happen since he lives in the post-invasion Greece and thus he could be applying his interpretation to history which is empirically true. Modern historians do similar things, whether intentional or not; Prof. Simms in his work Three Victories and a Defeat works from the premise that British policy was successful when working with Europe and he then analyses history from this viewpoint.
The actions of the Spartans in the battle show that Herodotus is true in this respect. Though vastly outnumbered (the three hundred Spartans is true, albeit they have support from helots and other Greeks). They lead Xerxes’ army into the pass only to turn on the army and annihilate them one by one. This of course plays on the arrogance of the Persians, who through Xerxes, already revealed that they believed Greeks would always flee at the sight of them. Demaratus clearly understood the Spartan tactic and thus berated Xerxes for not listening. Once again Xerxes’s arrogance was his downfall.
Though the Spartans were eventually defeated, this was not through the military expertise or strategic thinking of the Persians. Ultimately, they are aided by the actions of Ephialtes who reveals the hidden path through the pass which allows the ambush and final defeat of the Spartans. Xerxes does have the fortune of good luck in this instance, but as Solon said it would, this will quickly evaporate.
Herodotus also uses the battle to fulfill the typical duties of his role as a historian. He notes the Greeks of honor and especially the achievements of Leonidas. Importantly, many of those who were successful in the Battle were members of different parts of society, they were not all members of an aristocratic elite- this further reinforces Herodotus’ interest in society as a whole and with presenting a history for the Greek peoples.
Whilst Xerxes mutilates Leonidas’ body – an act that Herodotus denigrates as a truly despicable act- Demaratus advises attacking Sparta from an island. This seems to be a good piece of advice since the Spartans cannot abide the attack on their land. This raises the questions of Demaratus’ loyalty and where his heart truly resides. His character is resolved since Herodotus reveals that Demaratus helped the Spartans by sending the wax tablet with message carved into wood. This makes us, the readers, think Demaratus is wise after Xerxes’ adviser just chastised him and thus restores the reader’s faith. Importantly, though he helps the Persians, wisdom is shown to be present in all armies and civilizations. Herodotus thus shows it is the civilization that decides to utilize reason and experience which will be effective.
Herodotus’ depiction of the events not only shows his complexity and intrigue as a historian but shows the Spartans and Athenians in a new light. Athens is shown as pragmatic and reasoned, willing to make compromises with previous enemies and not quite destined for a path of hubris and eventual destruction. The Spartans make a Thermopylae the ultimate sacrifice and thus are made heroes in this tale; something which their words of wisdom before the battle shows is fitting of them. However, Herodotus also uses this history to show the need for the study of history itself by showing the failings of man when it places power with those who have no care for the study itself. Herodotus writes his own case into the failing of Xerxes.
Many of the trends Herodotus established in Book Five are continued in Book Six: the pace quickens and history becomes increasingly concerned with events in Athens and Sparta.
Ionia in rebellion
The account begins with the defeat of the Milesians and the other Ionians standing against Darius’ forces. Interestingly they are becoming more organised under the Phocians even practicing their naval manoeuvores. However, this ultimately fails to deter or prevent the Persians from encroaching and beating them.
When the Milesians were defeated and exiled from their city this is recorded as having an impact on the popular opinion in Athens. Herodotus shows his versatility as a historian in recording the influence that the play, The Fall of Miletus, had on the attitude of the Athenians. I mention this because it provides an insight into the culture of the Athenians and Herodotus’ use of sources.
Despite the devastating effect the play had on the emotions of the people, the Athenians were for the mean time, distant from the Revolt.
Sparta and Athens
Herodotus further illuminates on the relationship between Sparta and Athens. He does this by showing how the Spartans co-operated with the Athenians in their conflict with the Aeginetans. This is all based on the actions of one of their kings, Cleomenes and the claim that the Aeginetans had sided with Persia. Ultimately, this only leads to further divisions between the Spartan kings, however, there is a more interesting history being told at this point. This is in the fact that after the Aeginetans were beaten, the Spartans gave the Athenians the prisoners which they then refused to hand back to the Spartans. I mention this because the Spartans cite the example of Glaucus in their diplomacy with the Athenians, a man who did not give up his deposit and was subsequently punished by having his family and name expunged from the Spartan records. This is particularly revealing as it shows early examples of the reasoned, logical diplomacy that is evidenced in Thucydides’ work.
Herodotus then shows the reader the nature of the Spartan rule. Because of a myth, which is dubious in accuracy, the Spartans had two kings ruling at the same time. This of course was prone to causing conflicts and personal disputes amongst these kings. One of these disputes is relayed to the reader concerning Demaratus and Cleomenes. Cleomenes essentially conspired with Leotychidas to accuse Demaratus of not being the true king. This is supported by the lengthy anecdote of Ariston, Demaratus’ father, who was unable to conceive with any of his wives. This also reveal to the reader that the Spartan system, whilst being a monarchy, with the kings having the powers to go to war, was not a tyranny. This is because of the simple fact that the people could challenge their rulers and bring a court case against them.
Continuing the history of mad rulers, Cleomenes’ descent into madness is portrayed. This is first in that he slaughtered a number of innocent Argives and also this is shown by his failure to conquer all of Argos. This was leveled at him in a court case brought by the Spartan people against him, which although his justification that the gods didn’t want him to take Argos was accepted, is evidence of his erratic behavior. Herodotus reveals much about his own views when he describes this descent. He offers two reasons as to why Cleomenes descended into such madness. Firstly, he says the Spartans believed he had become made from drinking the stronger wines of the Scythians. Allegedly, a Scythian embassy had tried to persuade the Spartans to invade Persia and in their time in Sparta, drank frequently with him. However, Herodotus briefly says that the real reason that Cleomenes went mad was because of what he had done to his brother. Whilst this could be interpreted as being guilt, it seems likely that he meant this was some kind of punishment from the gods or karmic retribution. This affirms that Herodotus was moralistic and put much by the punishment brought about by hubris, suggesting that he constructed his history in a way that was deliberate.
Mardonius’ punishment of the Ionians got gradually closer toward Athens. The Eritreans were the next group to suffer: their punishment of slavery for the women and castration for the youngest boys was truly barbaric and Darius’ defeat at Marathon was only fitting punishment for his own cruelty. After the defeat of the Eritreans the Athenians tried to gain the assistance of the Spartans, who cordially declined because of their participation in a religious ceremony. This seems to not have hindered the final result and contributed to the battle’s shaping of the Athenian people. This is a fact confirmed by the Spartans arrival at the battlefield to remark and appreciate the power of the Athenians.
Kagan has said that Hippias’ advice to the Persians is a lesson in not listening to exiles. When he landed in Greece he had the vision of copulating with his mother, and in another Freudian moment for an Athenian he believed that this was evidence of his impending victory. Almost poetically, his realization that the dream meant that only his tooth would be reclaimed by Attica coincides nicely with the Persians’ stunning defeat.
I will not bore any reader of this blog with the exact details of how the battle was won since Herodotus does a far better job and this is not the purpose of this analysis. Much more interesting is Miltiades’ use of reason and logic to persuade the War Archon to stay and fight the Persians. Interesting it is because of the arguments that he puts forward. He argues primarily that it has split the generals of Athens in two and therefore could only lead to civil war if they made no attack on the Persians. However, his appeal to the glory and material gain that could be won if the Persians were defeated is what wins over the Archon. This is significant since it shows a long history in Athens of the primacy of imperial expansion that they always sought after.
Continuing his analysis of the Athenians, Herodotus examines the Alcmeonidae more closely. I can only conclude that Herodotus examines Athenian expansion (as is discussed above) and the Alcmeonidae because these two were connected through Pericles in the Peloponnesian War (the time in which Herodotus wrote in). What is interesting is that he recounts how they were unfairly treated by the other Athenians, accused by some of trying to warn the Persians of the attack at Marathon. Herodotus provides an analysis of why this would be a ludicrous claim since the Alcmeonidae had been the ones who had ultimately expelled the Pisistratidae. He claims that they deserve more honor than the two lovers who tried to kill Hippias since Cleisthenes was actually successful. This analysis sheds light on the difficulties Pericles experienced with the Spartans invoking the Alcmeonidae curse and the people removing him from office. It reveals further that the Athenians had a great capacity for dishonorable behavior as the result of jealousy.
Herodotus clearly admired the entire ancestry since he carefully relates their history. Firstly, how Alcmeon became rich through pure luck and reward by Croesus but also how Megacles successfully married the daughter of Cleisthenes. Their shrewd capacity as political leaders definitely foreshadows the success that Pericles would later have. The maneuvering of Cleisthenes was present in a leader who could banish the son of one of Athens’s most distinguished military commanders.
The initial expansion of Athens began in Book Five with the continuous war between the Aegenitans and the Boeotians . It increases with the pledge of allegiance from the Plateans, who were clearly afraid of their Theban neighbors (a fear that would be justified in the Peloponnesian War). Athens’s power was now beginning to become an asset since smaller countries appealed to them for protection. This also moves them closer to being a match for the Spartans since they had a similar system.
However, it seems as though it was charismatic leadership which would cause the Athenian expansion. This would first be through Miltiades who appears immediately to be a rogue like figure because of his earlier betrayal of the Persians in Book Four and his constant evasions of assassination attempts. Under his leadership the Athenians give the thirty ships required to attempt to conquer Paria, Pelasgus and Lemnus. Though two one of these actually succeed, the seeds were sown for the expansion of the Athenian people. Herodotus describes no opposition from the Athenian people in giving the resources to undergo ill thought out expeditions. They do punish Miltiades for his failure, the bill being picked up by his son Cimon. This only reveals the other side to Athenian culture: the obstinate denial and failure to accept that expansion can fail. Their consistent reaction in punishing the individual leader is only evidence of their denial of the problems of a system which directly votes people into power who will carry out military expeditions.
Herodotus reveals much about his own method in this Book and the successes and failures of the people involved. The Book shows the cruelty of warfare as well as the advancing nature of diplomacy.In addition, the fractious nature of the Greeks with their inability to unite even at a time of existential threat. Furthermore, the identity of the Athenians and Spartans are developed and so the observational reader can see the origins of the crowds who believed Alcibiades’ invasion of Sicily was a sensible, realistic and pragmatic solution to a war.
The narrative of Herodotus’ history begins to pick up substantially in Book Five; much of the ethnographic and geographic descriptions are sidelined. Herodotus’ descriptions of the Ionian Revolt, its implications of Athens and Sparta, give the reader a greater insight into his own political views and how this influenced his history.
The conquering of Ionia
It is interesting that at the beginning of Book Five Darius makes use of Histiaeus and other tyrants along with Megabyzus to conquer parts of Greece. It was not considered a particularly wealthy area, and as is revealed in Book One and Five, the Persians had very little knowledge of the most famous Greek states: Athens and Sparta. His motive can be speculated at, with the most logical conclusion (based on his expansionism in Book Three and Book Four) to have been the acquisition of power and status over other countries.
Several interesting anecdotes are relayed to the reader about the conquest of these areas, the most interesting being that of the attempted conquest of Macedonia. The use of deceit by Alexander of Macedon to lure the Persians to their deaths is entertaining. Furthermore, the reader learns that Darius was reliant on a series of military leaders to carry out the ground operations necessary to the Empire’s existence. The bribery of one of these leaders by the Macedonians shows the precarious structure of the Empire, an observation which will become more relevant later.
It appears as though Darius’ undoing is the system he has put in place to rule conquered lands. This is most apparent in the case of Histiaeus of Miletus since his removal of him to another land causes resentment and fear for the tyrant. Despite the alleged close friendship between the two, Histiaeus soon tries to revolt so as to create a reason to return to Miletus (by having his second in command, Aristagoras, rebel in the Persian-Greco conquest of Naxos).
The tension between the tyrant and Darius is ultimately the cause of failure. Whilst Herodotus offers a noble motive to Histiaeus, I don’t think it is too far to suggest that he had greater ambitions of power in his own land; if he did not, why not simply make greater use of his friendship to acquire favors from Darius? As shown in the execution of Orestes in Book Three, ambition and rebellion from Darius’ satraps was not uncommon and therefore this is a justified speculation.
Regardless of this, Aristagoras’ own ambition took to new heights. He certainly was an interesting figure since he went to such great lengths to ensure that the rebellion was not a mere minor distraction, but the beginning of a greater conflict between two peoples. His pleading to Cleomones of Sparta is especially revealing for two reasons. Firstly, he appeals to the Spartans on purely materialist persuasions- he tries to convince them it is in their best interest, thus revealing the revolt was not romantic, but pragmatic. Secondly, it reveals the staunchly conservative nature of the Spartans: even after hearing of all the brilliant and fantastic resources to be gained in a three month journey, they decide it is too far from the sea to pursue. This reaffirms what the historian Donald Kagan has said about the Spartans: they were always eager to stay put out of fear of the Argives and helot revolts.
Athenian rebellion, democracy and Spartan reaction
The revolution at Athens plays a central role in the Book, not just in narrative but in Herodotus’ intentions as well. Despite a failed assassination by two young men of Hippias (which is further detailed in Thucydides’ work since he deems the previous histories about the topic to be weak and shallow) it is not till the Alcmeonidae step in and put their efforts to overthrowing the tyranny that it happens. They are an interesting family since their role extends into later Athenian history through Pericles and his democratic reforms but also because they toppled the tyranny externally. We know from Thucydides and Book One of Herodotus that they were an aristocratic family and not involved initially with the people that Cleisthenes and Pericles would supposedly champion. In a dramatic twist, the tyrants are overthrown by the Spartan forces sent by Cleomenes and not by the Alcmeonidae directly. Instead their influence is more canny: they bribed the Oracles to mislead the Spartan forces. I say this is dramatic because Athens will become the greatest rival to Sparta, a fact soon acknowledged by the Spartans.
The plot thickens with the introduction of the factions of Isogaras and Cleisthenes. Herodotus gives little sense to demographic, social and economic make up of their followings beyond a vague description of the ‘people’ supporting Cleisthenes, and Spartans supporting Isogaras. One could speculate, since Cleisthenes brought in democratic reform and his descendants continued this, that he represented the hoplites and the merchant classes, as oppose to the conservative aristocrats. Ultimately, it is through cunning that Cleisthenes secures his power since he increased the number of tribes from four to ten and introduced the deme as a greater unit of dividing Attic territory up. Ultimately, it is rational reform in this instance which seizes the day for the Athenians under Cleisthenes.
I will draw back to my analysis of Book Three now. In Book Three the choice between democracy is made clear to the Persian conspirators led by Otanes and it is passed down in favor of the traditional system the Persians used. This is the condoning of poor leadership and the lack of challenge to such leadership which, especially under Xerxes, will prove to be disastrous. Here, we see the Athenians making the latter choice and the growth and success of their nation. There is no coincidence that this is discussed in detail in Book Five. For example, the Corinthians chastise the Spartans for giving asylum to Hippias and attempting to reinstall him as the tyrant of Athens. The Corinthians draw upon their own suffering under tyrants, particularly Periander who is accused of necrophilia and shaming women by burning their clothes in a deranged, paganistic ritual to make amends to his wife. Interestingly, the notion of poor leadership, tyranny and cruelty in monarchs is very similar to that stated by one of the conspirators in Book Three. I think Herodotus is drawing our attention to the very different path that the Hellenic world is undertaking, since whilst they don’t all embrace democracy, they begin to challenge authority and tradition. I think this passage should be examined regardless since the dynamics between the Corinthians and the Spartans is one of the Corinthians being able to challenge Spartan authority: a theme that appears in Thucydides.
Herodotus makes two claims about democracy, one which is explicit and commonly referred, and the other which is not. The first is that the Athenians were made better citizens and soldiers by their new rule since there was freedom for the individual and therefore self interest in achieving and being successful. Though the Spartans describe this as making Athenians arrogant, it seems to be a true claim. Firstly, this is because it tests well logically and also because in history it seems to be true compared to other civilizations. Countries which gradually gave freedom and liberty to their citizens rapidly developed and improved. In addition, the Athenians fight both the Boeotians, the Chalecidians and the Aeginetans in Book Five with success. All one needs to think of is the USA and Great Britain. In addition, Victor Davis Hanson’s research on the hoplite also reinforces this. This is because he argues that Greek society was distinguished from others because of the hoplites working the fields and fighting. He argues that most Greek society stayed the same because hoplites gained a level of political freedom and participation and this would only change if the hoplite changed. By incorporating equality before the law one could argue that this would change the hoplite mentality.
The second thing Herodotus says is that when Aristagoras went before the Athenian assembly they were much more easily persuaded than one man. This is not something often picked up on but it can suggest two things about Herodotus’ own views. On the one hand it could suggest that Herodotus was aware of the criticisms of democracy. This is supported by the context of his own lifetime (The Peloponnesian War) and also in the hubris that comes with the lack of checks and balances in power. Analysis of Pericles’ speeches reveals a standard set of limitless expansion and imperialism and therefore causing a perpetual war with other states. However, one could see his claim here as merely descriptive and his history as being objective. Either way, it reveal Herodotus as a purposeful historian and not a fabricator of lies.
Rebellion put down
The sense that Herodotus was making a point about democracy and Athens is ascertained from the fact that it takes a large amount of Book Five despite being relatively unimportant in the grand scheme of the Ionian Revolt. The Athenians join in the sack of Sardis and a second battle with the Persians but soon retreat after defeat.
Herodotus’ history does improve in the final part of Book Five. The descriptions of battles between the Ionians and the Persians are riveting and convey a certain sense of heroism. Whilst these battles were not in living memory, they serve as a testimony to Herodotus as the historian since he draws upon the magnitude and heroism of battles fought for the freedom of people close to his time. His descriptions of the Carians and their eventual destruction, despite Milesian reinforcement, are moving.
The Revolt ends with the death of Aristagoras, its ambitious founder. He died on the retreat when he accidentally encounters troops loyal to the Persians. What is so interesting is that it is clear that he has pragmatic and selfish motives at heart in causing unrest, Herodotus makes this clear, but what comes about is the genuine tale of liberation for a people.
Book Five is the culmination of Herodotus’ writing so far. This is the Book in which the reader sees the recognition he deserves for his history. Not only does he provide the next step in Greek heroism from Homer, but also the complex political and social changes that were going on. In a sense, this is Herodotus providing the first true Greek history, particularly for the Athenians, their individuality was written into these events. From here the reader learns about the divides between Sparta and Athens and the dangers both states face.
The use of the ‘Alcmeonidae curse’ by Isagoras and the Spartans is evidence of what Kagan calls ‘psychological warfare’. Megacles also had this happen to him in Book One and it confirms that this was an effective tactic when used in Book One of Thucydides
The Athenians immediately fought with the Boeotian and the Chalcidians after they gained their independence. The Aeginetans joined in with what Herodotus describes as ‘pleasure’ due to an older feud between the two states.